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41-6-65 MOTOR VEHICLEE; 
central dividing curb, separation section, or 
line" after "No person shall" at the begin-
ning of the section; and made a minor change 
in phraseology. 
The 1979 amendment substituted "con-
trolled-access" for "limited-access." 
Cross-References. 
Limited-access facilities generally, 
27-12-111 et seq. 
41-6-65. Controlled-access highways - Prohibiting use by class or 
kind of traffic - Traffic-control devices. The department of transporta-
tion by resolution or order entered in its minutes, and local authorities 
by ordinance may regulate or prohibit the use of any controlled-access 
roadway within their respective jurisdictions by any class or kind of traffic 
which is found to be incompatible with the normal and safe movement of 
traffic. 
The department of transportation or the local authority adopting any 
such prohibition shall erect and maintain official traffic-control devices on 
the controlled-access highway on which such prohibitions are applicable 
and when in place no person shall disobey the restrictions stated on such 
devices. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-129.12, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 21; 1979, 
ch. 242, § 18. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment substituted "regulate 
or prohibit the use of * * * and safe move-
ment of traffic" in the first paragraph for 
"with respect to any limited-access roadway 
under their respective jurisdictions, prohibit 
the use of any such roadway by pedestrians, 
bicycles, or other .nonmotorized traffic, or by 
any person operating a motor-driven cycle"; 
substituted in · the second paragraph, "high-
way" for "roadway," "traffic-control devices" 
for "official signs"; and made minor changes 
in phraseology. 
The 1979 amendment substituted "depart-
ment of transportation" for "state road com-
mission" in two places; and substituted "con-




TURNS AND SIGNALS ON STARTING, STOPPING 
OR TURNING 
41-6-66. Turning - Manner - Traffic-control devices. 
41-6-67. Turning around - Prohibited on curve or near crest of grade. 
41-6-68. Starting vehicles. 
41-6-69. Turning - Signals - Stopping or sudden decrease in speed - Signal flashing pro-
hibited. 
41-6-70. Signals - Methods of giving - Signal lamps. 
41-6-71. Signals - Manner of giving. 
41-6-66. Turning - Manner - Traffic-control devices. The driver 
of a vehicle intending to turn shall do so as follows: 
(1) Right Turns - Both the approach for a right turn and a right turn 
shall be made as close as practical to the right-hand curb or edge of the 
roadway. 
(2) Left Turns - The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall 
approach the turn from the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to 
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traffic moving in the direction of travel of such vehicle. Whenever practi-
cable, the left turn shall be made to the left of the center of the intersec-
tion so as to leave the intersection or other location in the extreme 
left-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the same direction 
as such vehicle on the roadway being entered. 
(3) The department of transportation and local authorities in their 
respective jurisdictions may cause official traffic-control devices to be 
placed and thereby require and direct that a different course from that 
specified in this section be traveled by vehicles turning, and when such 
devices are so placed no driver of a vehicle shall turn a vehicle other than 
as directed and required by such devices. 
(4) Where a special lane for making left turns by drivers proceeding 
in opposite directions has been indicated by official traffic-control devices: 
(a) A left turn shall not be made from any other lane. 
(b) A vehicle shall not be driven in the lane except when preparing for 
or making a left turn from or into the roadway or when preparing for or 
making a U-turn when otherwise permitted by law. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 53; C. 1943, 
57-7-130; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 22; 1978, ch. 33, § 17. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment rewrote the regula-
tions relating to left turns. 
The 1975 amendment deleted "at an inter-
section" after "intending to turn" in the 
introductory phrase; inserted "Right Turns" 
at the beginning of subd. (a); rewrote subd. 
(b) relating to left turns; deleted a subd. (c) 
relating to left turns; redesignated former 
subd. (d) as subd. (c); inserted "The state 
road commission" at the beginning of subd. 
(c); substituted references to official traffic-
control devices for references to markers, 
buttons or signs throughout subd. (c); and 
made minor changes in phraseology. 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subds. 
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); substituted "depart-
ment of transportation" near the beginning 
of subd. (3) for "state road commission"; 
deleted "within or adjacent to intersections" 
after "devices to be placed" in the middle of 
subd. (3); deleted "at an intersection" after 
"vehicles turning" and after "turn a vehicle" 
in subd. (3); added subd. (4); and made minor 
changes in phraseology. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <S:;o 171(12). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 367. 
Turning, 7A AmJur 2d 431-434, Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 256-259. 
Drivers of automobiles or other vehicles 
proceeding in same direction, reciprocal 
duties of, with respect to turning at intersec-
tions, 24 ALR 513, 47 ALR 712, 62 ALR 980, 
104 ALR 531. 
Failure of motorist to give signal for left 
turn at intersection, as against oncoming or 
intercepting motor vehicle, liability for acci-
dent arising from, 39 ALR 2d 65. 
Failure of motorist to give signal for left 
turn between intersections, liability for acci-
dent arising from, 39 ALR 2d 103. 
Violation of statute by motorist's failure to 
give signal for left turn at intersection with 
respect to motor vehicle proceeding in same 
direction, 39 ALR 2d 32. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Contributory negligence. 
Whether decedent's turn from an improper 
position on the highway without signaling 
was contributory negligence was question for 
jury under facts of case. Hansen v. Nicholas 
Moving & Storage, Inc. (1971) 451 F 2d 319. 
41-6-67. Turning around - Prohibited on curve or near crest of 
grade. (a) The driver of any vehicle shall not turn such vehicle so as to 
proceed in the opposite direction unless such movement can be made in 
safety and without interfering with other traffic. 
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(b) No vehicle shall be turned so as to proceed in the opposite direction 
upon any curve, or upon the approach to, or near the crest of a grade, · 
where such vehicle cannot be seen by the driver of any other vehicle 
approaching from either direction within 500 feet. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 54; C. 1943, 
57-7-131; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 23. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment inserted subsec. (a); 
and designated the former section as subsec. 
(b). 
Care required of plaintiff. 
The general rules as to degree of care 
required of a person acting in an emergency, 
created by wrongful act or negligence of 
defendant, apply to this section. Morrison v. 
Perry (1942) 104 U 139, 122 P 2d 191, reversed 
on rehearing 104 U 151, 140 P 2d 772. 
Collateral References. 
Liability arising from collision between 
automobile making U-turn and another vehi-
cle, 6 ALR 2d 1244. 
41-6-68. Starting vehicles. No person shall start a vehicle which is 
stopped, standing, or parked unless and until such movement can be made 
with reasonable safety. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 55; C. 1943, 
57-7-132. 
Sufficiency of evidence. 
In action for damages arising out of colli-
sion between motorcycle and truck, evidence 
was sufficient to support jury's finding that 
defendant, in violation of this section, moved 
his truck onto highway, from point where 
truck was parked on shoulder of highway, 
before such movement could be made with 
reasonable safety. Spackman v. Carson (1950) 
117 U 390,216 P 2d 640. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles~ 173(8). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 334. 
7A AmJur 2d 463, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 282. 
41-6-69. Tlll'ning - Signals - Stopping or sudden decrease in 
speed - Signal flashing prohibited. (1) No person shall turn a vehicle 
or move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can 
be made with reasonable safety nor without giving an appropriate signal 
in the manner hereinafter provided. 
(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left or to change lanes shall 
be given continuously for at least the last three seconds preceding the 
beginning of the turn or change. 
(3) No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a vehicle 
without first giving an appropriate signal to the driver of any vehicle 
immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to give such a signal. 
(4) The signals required on vehicles by section 41-6-70 shall not be 
flashed on one side only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a courtesy or "do 
pass" to operators of other vehicles approaching from the rear, nor be 
flashed on one side only of a parked vehicle except as may be necessary 
for compliance with this section. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 56; C. 1943, 
57-7-133; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 96, § 1; 
1975, ch. 207, § 24; 1978, ch. 33, § 18. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment rewrote subsec. (a) 
which included a requirement for giving a 
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clearly audible signal by sounding the horn if 
any pedestrian may be affected by turning 
from a direct course upon a highway. 
The 1971 amendment deleted "in the event 
any other traffic may be affected by such 
movement" at the end of subsec. (a); inserted 
"or to change lanes" in subsec. (b); substi-
tuted "for at least the last three seconds pre-
ceding the beginning of the run or change" 
for "during not less than the last 100 feet 
traveled by the vehicle before turning" in 
subsec. (b); deleted "in the manner provided 
herein" after "appropriate signal" in subsec. 
(c); and made a minor change in style. 
The 1975 amendment added "in the event 
any other traffic may be affected by such 
movement" to subsec. (a); and added subsec. 
(d). 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs. 
(a) to (d) as (1) to (4); deleted "at an intersec-
tion unless the vehicle is in proper position 
upon the roadway as required in section 
41-6-66, or turn a vehicle to enter a private 
road or driveway or otherwise turn a vehicle 
from a direct course" after "turn a vehicle" 
near the beginning of subsec. (1); deleted "in 
the event any other traffic may be affected by 
such movement" at the end of subsec. (l); 
and made minor changes in phraseology. 
Determination of matter of "reasonable 
safety." 
Facts may be so clear and indisputable 
that it may be said as a matter of law that 
turn could not be made "with reasonable 
safety," and that defendant's act in turning 
was, as a matter of law, the sole proximate 
cause of the collision and resulting damage, 
thus leaving to the jury the determination of 
the amount of such damage. Cederloff v. 
Whited (1946) 110 U 45, 169 P 2d 777. 
Effect of infant's age and capacity upon 
statutory duty. 
Consideration of infant's age and capacity 
should prevail over rule establishing negli-
gence as a matter of law upon violation of 
statutory duty; this does not mean that state 
utory violation rule is nullified where chil-
dren are involved. Morby v. Rogers (1953) 122 
U 540, 252 P 2d 231 (case of 13-year-old 
bicyclist who turned without signaling). 
Injury to pedestrians. 
Pedestrian denied recovery for injuries 
sustained when she was struck by overhang 
of motorbus, where from the evidence it 
appeared that when she was halfway across 
the street the traffic light changed against 
her and she stopped in the safety zone, giving 
the other traffic the right-of-way, and that 
the overhang of the bus struck her as it 
rounded the corner in response to traffic 
officer's express direction. Miller v. Utah 
Light & Traction Co. (1939) 96 U 369, 86 P 2d 
37. 
Proximate cause. 
Whether a truck driver was negligent in 
failing to look in rearview mirror at the time 
of a left turn, and whether his negligence, if 
any, was a proximate cause of the injury 
were questions for the jury. Hayden v. 
Cederlund (1953) 1 U 2d 171, 263 P 2d 796. 
Signal for stopping or suddenly decreas-
ing speed. 
Held that where statute required .defen-
dant to give an appropriate signal before 
stopping or suddenly decreasing his speed 
and no hand signal was given, the visible 
light showing the application of defendant's 
brakes was not compliance with the statute 
since it was simultaneous with the sudden 
decrease in speed, while the statute requires 
that an appropriate signal be given prior to 
stopping or suddenly decreasing the speed of 
a vehicle. United States v. First Security 
Bank (1953) 208 F 2d 424, 42 ALR 2d 951. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <P 151. 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 287. 
Construction and operation of regulations 
as to sudden stop or slowing of motor vehicle, 
29 ALR 2d 5. 
Duty of motor vehicle driver approaching 
place where children are playing or gathered, 
to stop or slow down, 30 ALR 2d 1030. 
Failure of motorist to give signal for left 
turn between intersections, liability for acci-
dent arising from, 39 ALR 2d 103. 
Liability for accident arising out of 
motorist's failure to give signal for right 
turn, 38 ALR 2d 143. 
Unsignaled stop or slowing of motor vehi-
cle as negligence, 29 ALR 2d 5. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORME.R LAW 
Contributory negligence. 
Whether decedent's turn from an improper 
position on the highway without signaling 
was contributory negligence was question for 
jury under facts of case. Hansen v. Nicholas 
Moving & Storage, Inc. (1971) 451 F 2d 319. 
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41-6-70. Signals - Methods of giving - Signal lamps. (1) Any stop 
or turn signal when required shall be given either by the hand and arm 
or by signal lamps, except as provided in paragraph (2). 
(2) Any motor vehicle in use on a highway shall be equipped with, and 
required signal shall be given by, signal lamps when the distance from the 
center of the top of the steering post to the left outside limit of the body, 
cab or load of such motor vehicle exceeds twenty-four inches, or when the 
distance from the center of the top of the steering post to the rear limit 
of the body or load thereof exceeds fourteen feet. The latter measurement 
shall apply to any single vehicle, also to any combination of vehicles. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 57; C. 1943, 
57-7-134; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1957, ch. 78, § 4; 
1978, ch. 33, § 19. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment substituted "except 
as provided in paragraph (b)" at the end of 
subsec. (a) for "but when a vehicle is so con-
structed or loaded that a hand and arm sig-
nal would not be visible both to the front and 
rear of such vehicle then said signals must be 
given by such a lamp or device"; and added 
subsec. (b ). 
The 1957 amendment substituted "a sig-
nal" for "a signal lamp or signal device" in 
subsec. (a); substituted "said lamps" for "or 
mechanical signal device, said lamps or 
devices" in the first sentence of subsec. (b ); 
and changed the effective date from 1956 to 
1958. 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs. 
(a) and (b) as (1) and (2); deleted references 
to signal lamps approved by the state road 
commission in two places; deleted "The 
requirements of this section shall become 
effective January 1, 1958" at the end of the 
section; and made minor changes in phrase-
ology. 
41-6-71. Signals - Manner of g1vtng. All signals herein required 
given by hand and arm shall be given from the left side of the vehicle 
in the following manner and such signals shall indicate as follows: 
(1) Left turn. Hand and arm extended horizontally. 
(2) Right turn. Hand and arm extended upward. 
(3) Stop or decrease speed. Hand and arm extended downward. 












RIGHT OF WAY 
Right of way between vehicles. 
Right of way - Stop or yield signals - Collisions at intersections or junctions 
of roadways. 
Vehicle turning left. 
Vehicle entering a through highway. 
Failure to yield right of way - Effect of collision - Rule on entering stop or 
yield intersection. 
Entering or crossing highway other than from another roadway. 
Emergency vehicle - Duties of respective drivers. 
Vehicle or pedestrian working upon highway - Right of way. 
41-6-72. Right of way between vehicles. (a) When two vehicles enter 
or approach an intersection from different highways at approximately the 
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same time the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way 
to the vehicle on the right. 
(b) The right-of-way rule declared in paragraph (a) is modified at 
through highways and otherwise as hereinafter stated in this chapter. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 59; C. 1943, has it may not claim it in face of danger 
57-7-136; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, which one exercising due care could see and 
§ 25. avoid; driver having right-of-way was never-
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment inserted "or 
approach" and "approximately" in the sub-
section regarding right-of-way for two vehi-
cles; and made a minor change in phraseol-
ogy. 
The 1975 amendment deleted a subsec. (a) 
which provided that an approaching driver 
should yield the right-of-way to a vehicle 
which has already entered the intersection 
from a different highway; and redesignated 
former subsecs. (b) and (c) as (a) and (b). 
Construction and application. 
In crowded street greater degree of care 
and vigilance is required in approaching 
intersections and crossings where both 
pedestrians and vehicles of all kinds have 
right to pass both ways, than is case between 
street crossings. Richards v. Palace Laundry 
Co. (1919) 55 U 409, 186 P 439. 
The rights and duties prescribed by this 
section are only relative, and must be applied 
in the light of the conditions existing at the 
time. It is the duty of both parties to use 
such caution as a reasonably prudent person 
would have done in entering the intersection 
and to yield the right-of-way if under the cir-
cumstances a reaonably prudent person 
would have done so. If failure to yield right-
of-way proximately contributed to the acci-
dent, that may bar plaintiff or render defen-
dant liable. Smith v. Lenzi (1929) 74 U 362, 
279 P 893, applying former Motor Vehicle 
Law. 
The rights of the possessor of the right-of-
way under this section are only relative, and 
one is not relieved of the duty of using due 
care simply because he is the apparent pos-
sessor of the right-of-way. The question is: 
Whose negligence was the proximate cause of 
the accident and injury, and not simply who 
entered the intersection first. Sine v. Salt 
Lake Transp. Co. (1944) 106 U 289, 147 P 2d 
875, following Bullock v. Luke (1940) 98 U 
501, 98 P 2d 350. 
Contributory negligence of favored 
driver. 
Although driver approaching from right 
had right-of-way over driver approaching 
from left, right is not absolute and one who 
theless contributorily negligent in light of 
evidence that he had not kept proper lookout. 
Hughes v. Hooper (1967) 19 U 2d 389, 431 P 
2d 983. 
Duty to yield. 
Driver on left at street intersection is not 
required to yield right-of-way to driver 
approaching from right unless collision is to 
be "reasonably apprehended." Collins v. 
Liddle (1926) 67 U 242, 247 P 476. 
Duty of drivers at street intersections is 
discussed at length in Sine v. Salt Lake 
Transp. Co. (1944) 106 U 289, 147 P 2d 875. 
Motorist approaching intersection from 
right had right-of-way over motorist 
approaching from left if former either 
reached intersection first or at same time as 
latter. Martin v. Sheffield (1948) 112 U 478, 
189 P 2d 127. 
Evidence and questions for jury. 
In action arising out of intersection colli-
sion, evidence sufficiently established prima 
facie case of negligence on part of defendant 
in failing to yield right-of-way and in travel-
ing at excessive rate of speed, and contribu-
tory negligence on part of plaintiff in failing 
to keep proper lookout and in traveling at 
excessive rate of speed was for jury. Martin 
v. Sheffield (1948) 112 U 478, 189 P 2d 127. 
The mere fact that a driver has the right-
of-way does not excuse him from exercising 
due care and keeping a proper lookout to 
avoid collisions with vehicles failing to yield; 
however, questions relating to rights and 
duties of drivers approaching intersections 
are primarily problems to be resolved by the 
trier of fact and only when reasonable minds 
could not differ in reaching a contrary deter-
mination does it become necessary to upset 
these factual resolutions. Country Club Foods 
v. Barney (1960) 10 U 2d 317,352 P 2d 776. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles ea> 171(4). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 363. 
Right of way, 7A AmJur 2d 410 et seq., 
Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 236 et 
seq. 
Automobile crossing street at a point other 
than a street intersection, 57 ALR 1106. 
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Duty of driver of vehicle approaching 
intersection of one-way street with other 
street, 62 ALR 2d 275. 
Negligence, right of way at street or high-
way intersections as dependent upon, or inde-
pendent of, 89 ALR 838,136 ALR 1497. 
Right of way as between vehicles as 
affected by relative distances or time of 
reaching intersection, 175 ALR 1013. 
Right of way at street or highway intersec-
tions, 21 ALR 974, 37 ALR 493, 47 ALR 595. 
Streetcar colliding with automobile at 
intersection, liability for injuries, 28 ALR 
217, 46 ALR 1000. 
What is street or highway intersection 
within traffic rules, 7 ALR 3d 1204. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Motor bike driver. 
"Driver" as used in this section included 
thirteen-year-old motor bike driver; and his 
failure to yield right-of-way barred his 
recovery for injuries sustained when struck 
by motorist. Stevens v. Salt Lake County 
(1970) 25 U 2d 168, 478 P 2d 496. 
41-6-72.10. Right of way - Stop or yield signals - Collisions at 
intersections or junctions of roadways. (1) Preferential right of way 
may be indicated by stop signs or yield signs as authorized in section 
41-6-99. 
(2) Except when directed to proceed by a police officer, every driver of 
a vehicle approaching the stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop 
line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the 
intersection, or if none, then at a point nearest the intersecting roadway 
where the driver has a view of approaching traffic on the intersecting road-
way before entering it. After having stopped, the driver shall yield the 
right of way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another 
roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time 
when such driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction 
of roadways. 
(3) The driver of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall in obedience 
to such sign slow down to a speed reasonable for the existing conditions 
and if required for safety to stop, shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, 
and if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersec-
tion, or if none, then at the point nearest the intersecting roadway where 
the driver has a view of approaching traffic <;m the intersecting roadway 
before entering it. After slowing or stopping, the driver shall yield the 
right of way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another 
roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time 
such driver is moving across or within the intersection or junction of road-
ways. Provided, that if such a driver is involved in a collision with a vehicle 
in the intersection or junction of roadways, after driving past a yield sign 
without stopping, such collision is prima facie evidence of the driver's fail-
ure to yield the right of way. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-72.10, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1975, ch. 207, § 26; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 20. Laws 1975, ch. 207, § 26 repealed old 
section 41-6-72.10 (L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1961, 
ch. 86, § 1), relating to right-of-way between 
vehicles, and enacted new section 41-6-72.10. 
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The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs. 
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); deleted "at an intersec-
tion" after "right of way" in subsec. (1); sub-
stituted "or junction of roadways, after driv-
ing past a yield sign without stopping, such 
collision is prima facie evidence of the 
driver's failure to yield the right of way" at 
the end of subsec. (3) for "the vehicle division 
shall forward a copy of the notice to the 
owner or person in charge of the garage or 
place where the vehicle is stored"; deleted 
former subsecs. (d) and (e) which read: 
"(d) For the purposes of this section, a 
vehicle shall be presumed to be abandoned if 
it is left unattended on a highway for a 
period in excess of 24 hours or on any public 
or private property without express or 
implied consent of the owner or person in 
lawful possession or control of the property 
for a period in excess of seven days. 
"(e) In the event a vehicle is not 
reclaimed by the registered owner or any lien 
holder within thirty days, the provisions of 
sections 41-1-79.5, 41-1-116, and 41-1-117 
shall apply"; and made minor changes in 
phraseology. 
Immediate hazard. 
Testimony that disfavored vehicle was well 
into or through intersection at time of colli-
sion with favored vehicle did not establish 
that approaching favored vehicle was not an 
immediate hazard. Cintron v. Milkovich 
(1980) 611 P 2d 730. 
Speeding drivers. 
Right-of-way is not transferred to a disfa-
vored driver by fact that favored driver 
exceeds the posted speed. Cintron v. 
Milkovich (1980) 611 P 2d 730. 
41-6-73. Vehicle turning left. The driver of a vehicle intending to turn 
to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway 
shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction which is within the intersection or so close to the turning vehicle 
as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 60; C. 1943, 
57-7-137; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 27. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment substituted "during 
the time when such driver is moving within 
the intersection" for "but said driver, having 
so yielded and having given a signal when 
and as required by this act, may make such 
left turn and the drivers of all other vehicles 
approaching the intersection from said oppo-
site direction shall yield the right of way to 
the vehicle making the left turn." 
The 1975 amendment inserted "or into an 
alley, private road, or driveway"; deleted 
"during the time when such driver is moving 
within the intersection" at the end of the 
section; and made minor changes in phrase-
ology. 
Burden placed on driver making turn. 
When a statute prescribes that a turning 
vehicle must yield the right-of-way to 
another on a straight of way when the latter 
is close enough to constitute a hazard, it 
anticipates the exercise of reasonable judg-
ment on the part of the driver turning. How-
ever, a burden is placed on the driver making 
the turn as he has control of the situation, 
and if there is a reasonable probability that 
the movement cannot be made in safety then 
the disfavored driver should yield. French v. 
Utah Oil Refining Co. (1950) 117 U 406, 216 P 
2d 1002. 
Evidence. 
Where prosecution grew out of a collision 
at an intersection, due to alleged reckless 
driving of defendant in making turn in viola-
tion of this section, Supreme Court thought 
"there was ample evidence of conduct of 
defendant which jury could properly find was 
reckless and in marked disregard for the 
rights and safety of others." State v. Newton 
(1943) 105 U 561, 144 P 2d 290. 
Fulfillment of duty. 
If the left-turner, in performing his duty 
under this section by making the required 
observation, sees no vehicle approaching, or 
that any coming are far enough away so that 
the left-turner can reasonably believe that he 
has time to make his turn, he may proceed. 
Where a dispute arises as to this point, the 
question is one for the jury. Smith v. 
Gallegos (1965) 16 U 2d 344, 400 P 2d 570. 
"Immediate hazard." 
In action arising out of collision between 
automobile driven by plaintiff and truck 
driven by defendant at intersection where 
plaintiff made left turn across path of 
approaching traffic, evidence conclusively 
established that truck was so close to inter-
section at time plaintiff made left turn as to 
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constitute an "immediate hazard." French v. 
Utah Oil Refining Co. (1950) 117 U 406, 216 P 
2d 1002, distinguished in 121 U 143, 239 P 2d 
215. 
Where the defendant attempted to turn 
across the path of the plaintiff, when he was 
only 40 feet away, the trial court could 
reasonably conclude that plaintiff was so 
close as to constitute an immediate hazard 
and that the defendant should have yielded 
the right-of-way to him. Yeates v. Budge 
(1953) 122 U 518, 252 P 2d 220. 
Instructions. 
There is no right to an instruction covering 
the qualifying part of this section, unless 
there is evidence to support such a charge. 
State v. Newton (1943) 105 U 561, 144 P 2d 
290. 
Involuntary manslaughter. 
Under a former section in R.S. 1933, which 
is practically identical with this section, it 
was held, in reversing a conviction of 
involuntary manslaughter, that no criminal 
liability is imposed upon the defendant 
because he crossed the line of northbound 
traffic, unless he did so recklessly or in 
willful or wanton disregard of the rights and 
safety of others. State v. Adamson (1942) 101 
U 534, 125 P 2d 429. 
In involuntary manslaughter prosecution 
arising out of collision by defendant's car 
with car in which decedent was riding, 
wherein evidence showed that latter car, is 
making left turn short distance beyond inter-
section for purpose of entering intersecting 
street, had crossed almost completely over 
two lanes for oncoming traffic and had made 
short backward movement before impact 
from defendant's oncoming automobile 
occurred, it could not be said as matter of 
law that left turn was not made in exercise 
of due care and, under all evidence, jury 
could find that, by reason of defendant's 
intoxicated condition, he failed to react in 
normal manner to situation which con-
fronted him, and that his conduct was 
responsible cause of collision and resulting 
death. State v. McQuilkin (1948) 113 U 268, 
193 P 2d 433, distinguishing 110 U 45, 169 P 
2d 777. 
Violation of statute. 
Motorist who signaled for left turn and 
had almost completed it when defendant, 
who had just started from parked position, 
collided with rear end of motorist's car while 
trying to go through intersection, was not 
shown to have violated this section, notwith-
standing that evidence was at best controver-
sial and was somewhat based on estimates as 
to split-second circumstances as to time, dis-
tance and judgment. Hawkins v. Allen (1965) 
16 U 2d 293, 400 P 2d 12. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles e=> 171(4). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 363. 
7A AmJur 2d 431, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 256. . 
Cutting corners as negligence, 115 ALR 
1178. 
Liability for accident arising from failure 
of motorist to give signal for left turn at 
intersection as against motor vehicle pro-
ceeding in same direction, 39 ALR 2d 15. 
Liability for accident arising from failure 
of motorist to give signal for left turn at 
intersection, as against oncoming or inter-
secting motor vehicle, 39 ALR 2d 65. 
Liability for accident arising from failure 
of motorist to give signal for left turn 
between intersections, 39 ALR 2d 103. 
Rights and liabilities as between drivers of 
motor vehicles proceeding in the same direc-
tion, where one or both attempt to pass on 
left of another vehicle so proceeding, 27 ALR 
2d 317. 
What is street or highway intersection 
within traffic rules, 7 ALR 3d 1204. 
41-6-74. Vehicle entering a through highway. (a) The driver of a 
vehicle shall stop as required by this act at the entrance to a through high-
way and shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have entered 
the intersection from said through highway or which are approaching so 
closely on said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but 
said driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all other vehi-
cles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield the 
right of way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the through high-
way. 
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop in obedience to a stop 
sign as required herein at an intersection where a stop sign is erected at 
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one or more entrances thereto although not a part of a through highway 
and shall proteed cautiously, yield right of way to vehicles not so obliged 
to stop which are within the intersection or approaching so closely as to 
constitute an immediate hazard, but may then proceed. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 61; C. 1943, 
57-7-138; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment substituted "yield 
right of way" for "yielding" in subsec. (b ). 
Construction and application. 
Defendant motorist on through highway, 
who was approaching intersection 400 to 500 
feet therefrom at 45 miles per hour when 
plaintiff motorist attempted to cross highway 
at intersection after having stopped at stop 
sign, was not approaching so closely as to 
constitute "immediate hazard" within mean-
ing of municipal ordinance conforming to 
this section, and therefore ordinance 
required defendant to yield right-of-way to 
plaintiff. (Rev. Ord. Salt Lake City 1944, 
§ 6128 (c) 2.) Hickok v. Skinner (1948) 113 U 
1, 190 P 2d 514. 
A person is not guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law in traversing an intersection at 
a speed of five or six miles per hour. It is a 
proper question to be answered by the jury 
under proper instructions. Bates v. Burns 
(1955) 3 U 2d 180, 281 P 2d 209. 
Immediate hazard. 
There is no precise set of measurements by 
which an immediate hazard can be gauged, 
but it must be judged on the basis of common 
sense in the light of the existing circum-
stances. Richards v. Anderson (1959) 9 U 2d 
17,337 P 2d 59. 
Where believable but controversial evi-
dence based on estimates of split-second cir-
cumstances showed that plaintiff had almost 
completed a left turn when defendant, who 
had just pulled out of a parked position, col-
lided with the rear end of plaintiff's vehicle 
while attempting to go through the intersec-
tion, the trial court, in its discretion, could 
find that defendant was negligent and plain-
tiff was nonnegligent; and the Supreme Court 
could not hold, as a matter of law, that plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent in failing to 
yield right-of-way where there was an 
immediate hazard. Hawkins v. Allen (1965) 
16 U 2d 293, 400 P 2d 12. 
Negligence, contributory negligence and 
last clear chance. 
Plaintiff motorist, who stopped at stop sign 
on intersecting street and observed defen-
dant's car 400 to 500 feet away on through 
highway approaching intersection at 
unknown speed, in starting forward from 
point 20 feet back from intersection and driv-
ing into and almost across intersection for 
distance of 65 feet without again looking in 
direction from which defendant's car was 
approaching, was contributorily negligent as 
matter of law, barring recovery for damages 
arising out of collision, notwithstanding that 
plaintiff had right-of-way over defendant by 
virtue of municipal ordinance conforming to 
this section, and even though plaintiff had 
concluded upon observing defendant's car 
that he had time to clear intersection, and 
last clear chance doctrine was inapplicable. 
(Rev. Ord. Salt Lake City 1944, § 6128 (c) 2.) 
Hickok v. Skinner (1948) 113 U 1, 190 P 2d 
514. 
Driver of truck traveling between 30 and 
45 miles per hour on arterial highway who, 
when at least one-quarter of block from 
intersection, observed car approaching from 
his left which was closer to intersection than 
truck, but did not again look in direction of 
car until it was too late to avoid collision 
because of assumption that truck had right-
of-way by virtue of stop sign, was negligent 
as matter of law. Conklin v. Walsh (1948) 113 
U 276, 193 P 2d 437. 
Plaintiff motorist driving on preferred 
highway, who had ample time to observe and 
avoid a collision with defendant motorist 
entering the highway, was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. Richards v. Anderson (1959) 
9 U 2d 17,337 P 2d 59. 
Rights and duties of respective drivers. 
Regardless of which driver is technically 
entitled to right-of-way, both must use due 
care and caution in proceeding into and 
across intersection and both have burden to 
keep proper lookout and to use reasonable 
care to avoid collision, and neither should be 
permitted to close his eyes to other vehicles 
which he knows or has reason to believe are 
approaching, merely because statute or 
municipal ordinance designates him the pre-
ferred driver. Hickok v. Skinner (1948) 113 U 
1, 190 P 2d 514. 
Fact that plaintiff motorist, in crossing 
through highway at intersection after having 
stopped at stop sign, had right-of-way over 
defendant motorist on through highway by 
virtue of municipal ordinance conforming to 
this section, did not permit plaintiff, after 
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having observed defendant's car approaching 
intersection, to thereafter completely ignore 
that car even though at time plaintiff started 
he might reasonably have believed that he 
had time in which to get safely across. (Rev. 
Ord. Salt Lake City 1944, § 6128(c) 2.) Hickok 
v. Skinner (1948) 113 U 1, 190 P 2d 514. 
Driver may cross over arterial highway 
after having stopped at stop sign, although 
he must yield right-of-way to cars which are 
close enough to constitute immediate hazard. 
Conklin v. Walsh (1948) 113 U 276, 193 P 2d 
437. 
Duty to keep proper lookout applies as well 
to favored as to disfavored driver, and nei-
ther can excuse his own failure to observe 
because other driver failed in his duty, and 
neither is excused for want of diligence or 
failure to see what is plain to be seen. 
Conklin v. Walsh (1948) 113 U 276, 193 P 2d 
437. 
Driver on arterial highway has duty to 
remain reasonably alert to possibility of dis-
favored driver starting across intersection in 
belief that he can cross in safety. Conklin v. 
Walsh (1948) 113 U 276, 193 P 2d 437. 
A driver entering the intersection first 
does not necessarily have the right-of-way. 
Williams v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Institu-
tion (1957) 6 U 2d 283, 312 P 2d 564. 
If the disfavored driver has made his stop 
and deferred to all vehicles that would be 
required to brake sharply or suddenly to 
avoid collision, the cars far enough away to 
have a clear margin to observe and make a 
smooth, safe stop are not an "immediate 
hazard" and are required to yield. Richards 
v. Anderson (1959) 9 U 2d 17,337 P 2d 59. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles e=> 171(2). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 350. 
7A AmJur 2d 413, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 240. 
Rights and duties at intersection of arte-
rial (or other favored) highway and 
nonfavored highway, 58 ALR 1197, 81 ALR 
185. 
41-6-74.10. Failure to yield right of way - Effect of collision -
Rule on entering stop or yield intersection. Yield right of way. (a) In 
the event that a driver, after having driven past a yield sign or a stop 
sign, is involved in a collision with a pedestrian having right of way in 
a crosswalk or a vehicle having right of way in the intersection such colli-
sion shall be deemed prim a f acie evidence of his failure to yield the right 
of way as required by this section, but shall not be considered negligence 
per se in determining legal liability for such accident. 
(b) Vehicle entering stop or yield intersection. Except when directed to 
proceed by a police officer or traffic-control signal, every driver of a vehicle 
approaching a stop intersection indicated by a stop sign shall stop as 
required by section 41-6-99 and after having stopped shall yield the right 
of way to any vehicle which has entered the intersection from another 
highway or which is approaching so closely on another highway as to con-
stitute an immediate hazard during the time when such driver is moving 
across or within the intersection. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-74.10, enacted by L. 
1961, ch. 86, § 2. 
Title of Act. 
An act amending sections 41-6-2, 41-6-3, 
41-6-4, 41-6-5, and 41-6-9, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953; section 41-6-14, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as amended by chapter 71, Laws 
of Utah 1955; section 41-6-17, 41-6-24, 41-6-27, 
41-6-29, 41-6-35, 41-6-37, and 41-6-72, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953; section 41-6-72.10, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by 
chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1955; section 
41-6-73, 41-6-74, Utah Code Annotated 1953; 
section 41-6-80, Utah Code Annotated 1953; 
section 41-6-82, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended by chapter 71, Laws of Utah 
1955; section 41-6-97, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended by chapter 65, Laws of 
Utah 1949; section 41-6-98, and 41-6-99, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953; section 41-6-100.10, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by 
chapter 66, Laws of Utah 1959; section 
41-6-123, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1955; 
section 41-6-140, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended by chapter 71, Laws of Utah 
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1955; section 41-6-140.10, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953; section 41-6-140.20, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 71, 
Laws of Utah 1955; section 41-6-145, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953; section 41-6-150, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953; section 41-6-160, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 
78, Laws of Utah 1957, pertaining to regu-
lating traffic on highways; and enacting new 
sections to be known as 41-6-74.10, 
41-6-148.10, 41-6-148.30, 41-6-148.40, and 
41-6-169.10, respecting safety belts, modi-
fying the structure of vehicles, safety chains 
on trailers, and obeying commands of a 
police officer. - Laws 1961, ch. 86. 
Operation and effect. 
Where the evidence was unclear as to 
whether defendant's entry into a regulated 
intersection constituted an "immediate 
hazard" to the plaintiff, such question should 
have been given to the jury and it was error 
for the trial judge to instruct that the occur-
rence of a collision was prima facie evidence 
that plaintiff had the right-of-way. Johnson 
v. Cornwall Warehouse Co. (1964) 15 U 2d 
172,389 P 2d 710. 
41-6-75. Entering or crossing highway other than from another 
roadway. The driver of a vehicle about to enter or· cross a highway from 
any place other than another roadway shall yield the right of way to all 
vehicles approaching on the roadway to be entered or crossed. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 62; C. 1943, 
57-7-139; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 28; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 21. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment inserted "or from 
any place other than another roadway"; and 
substituted "the roadway to be entered or 
crossed" at the end of the section for "said 
highway." 
The 1978 amendment deleted "a private 
road or driveway or from" before "any 
place." 
Contributory negligence. 
Plaintiff was not guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, where plain-
tiff, driving at 25 miles per hour on icy high-
way, first saw defendant's bus being backed 
out of yard when plaintiff was approximately 
300 feet from defendant's driveway, and 
plaintiff applied his brakes when about half 
the distance from the driveway upon real-
izing that defendant was not going to yield 
right-of-way, but was unable to avoid colli-
sion with defendant who had backed entirely 
across road. Nielson v. Mauchley (1949) 115 U 
68, 202 P 2d 547. 
Last clear chance doctrine. 
The doctrine of last clear chance is well 
established in Utah, not only where the 
defendant actually knew of plaintiff's peril, 
but also where defendant, in the exercise of 
reasonable care, should have known that 
plaintiff was so endangered. Beckstrom v. 
Williams (1955) 3 U 2d 210, 282 P 2d 309. 
As a general rule the doctrine of last clear 
chance is of limited application in the case of 
two moving vehicles as the application of the 
doctrine in a case where both vehicles were 
moving and rapidly changing positions with 
respect to one another is fraught with diffi-
culties. However, where one vehicle is 
moving very slowly this limitation of the doc-
trine is much less cogent. Beckstrom v. 
Williams (1955) 3 U 2d 210, 282 P 2d 309. 
Rights and duties of drivers. 
This section does not give driver of vehicle 
who has right-of-way the right to proceed 
without regard to existing conditions, and 
such driver must exercise due care and act as 
reasonably prudent man would act under all 
existing circumstances. Nielson v. Mauchley 
(1949) 115 U 68, 202 P 2d 547. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <P 167(3). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 347. 
7A AmJur 2d 417, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 242. 
Duty at private crossing or driveway, 24 
ALR946. 
Private driveway, right of way as between 
vehicles in street or highway and vehicles 
approaching from, 50 ALR 283. 
41-6-76. Emergency vehicle - Duties of respective drivers. 
(a) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle 
making use of audible and visual signals meeting the requirements of this 
act, or of a police vehicle properly and lawfully making use of an audible 
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signal only, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right of way 
and shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as pos-
sible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the highway, clear of any intersec-
tion and shall stop and remain in such position until the authorized 
emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a police 
officer. 
(b) This section shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized 
emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety 
of all persons using the highway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 63; C. 1943, 
57-7-140; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 
1975, ch. 207, § 29. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted "equipped 
with at least one lighted lamp exhibiting red 
light visible under normal atmospheric con-
ditions from a distance of 500 feet to the 
front of such vehicle and" after "authorized 
emergency vehicle" near the beginning of 
subsec. (a). 
The 1955 amendment deleted the provision 
inserted by the 1949 amendment; and substi-
tuted "making use of audible and visual 
signals meeting the requirements of this act" 
in subsec. (a) for "when the driver is giving 
audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle or 
bell." 
The 1975 amendment inserted "or of a 
police vehicle properly and lawfully making 
use of an audible signal only" in subsec. (a). 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles IP 175(3). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 371. 
7A AmJur 2d 419, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 244. 
Policeman, right of way of vehicle carry-
ing, 65 ALR 140. 
Validity of statute or ordinance giving 
right of way in streets or highways to certain 
classes of vehicles, 38 ALR 24. 
41-6-76.10. Vehicle or pedestrian working upon highway - Right 
of way. (a) The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to any 
authorized vehicle or pedestrian actually engaged in work upon a highway 
within any highway construction or maintenance area indicated by official 
traffic-control devices. 
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to any authorized 
vehicle obviously and actually engaged in work upon a highway whenever 
such vehicle displays lights meeting the requirements of section 
41-6-140.20. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-76.10, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 207, § 30. 
Title of Act. 
An act amending sections 41-6-2, 41-6-4, 
and 41-6-99, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1961, 
section 41-6-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by chapter 78, Laws of Utah 1957, 
as amended by chapter 86, Laws of Utah 
1961, sections 41-6-6, 41-6-7, 41-6-76, and 
41-6-90, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1955, 
section 41-6-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1955, 
as amended by chapter 81, Laws of Utah 
1973, sections 41-6-9 and 41-6-82, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 71, 
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by chapter 
86, Laws of Utah 1961, sections 41-6-10, 
41-6-25, 41-6-26, 41-6-53, 41-6-57, 41-6-58, 
41-6-59, 41-6-61, 41-6-62, 41-6-65, 41-6-66, 
41-6-67, 41-6-75, 41-6-78, 41-6-85, 41-6-88, 
41-6-101, 41-6-102, 41-6-104, 41-6-106, 
41-6-110, 41-6-111, 41-6-112, 41-6-143, 
41-6-146, 41-6-151, and 41-6-152, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, section 41-6-24, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 86, 
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by chapter 
81, Laws of Utah 1973, section 41-6-64, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as re-enacted by chap-
ter 71, Laws of Utah 1955, section 41-6-69, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by 
chapter 96, Laws of Utah 1971, sections 
41-6-72 and 41-6-73, Utah Code Annotated 
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1953, as amended by chapter 86, Laws of 
Utah 1961, section 41-6-100.10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 66, 
Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by chapter 
86, Laws of Utah 1961, section 41-6-141, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 
71, Laws of Utah 1955, section 41-6-142, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 
71, Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by chap-
ter 93, Laws of Utah 1967, section 41-6-151.5, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by 
chapter 88, Laws of Utah 1973, enacting sec-
tions 41-6-19.10, 41-6-76.10, 41-6-79.20, 
41-6-82.10, 41-6-106.10, 41-6-108.10, 
41-6-109.10, 41-6-116.10, and 41-6-175.5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, repealing and 
re-enacting section 41-6-48, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as amended by chapter 77, Laws 
of Utah 1957, as amended by chapter 81, 
Laws of Utah 1973, section 41-6-72.10, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 
71, Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by chap-
ter 86, Laws of Utah 1961, and section 
41-6-79, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended by chapter 110, Laws of Utah 1969, 
and repealing section 41-6-52.1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 77, 
Laws of Utah 1957, section 41-6-63, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended by chapter 
78, Laws of Utah 1957, as amended by chap-
ter 67, Laws of Utah 1959; providing for addi-
tional and extended definitions; providing for 
traffic and pedestrian movements at 
signalized intersections and along roadways; 
altering the prima facie limit and allowing 
cities of the second and third class authority 
to change prima facie speed limits after a 
traffic engineering study; clarifying driving 
to the left of the center line, land use and 
prohibition · of limited-access roadway use; 
clarification of procedures for left, right and 
U-turns; modifying the right-of-way rule at 
uncontrolled intersections; pertaining to 
bicycle equipment and driver activity; chang-
ing the stopping requirements for vehicles on 
overtaking a school bus; enlarging a police 
officer's right to move abandoned and parked 
vehicles; changing the responsibility of test-
ing certain equipment from the state road 
commission to the department of public 
safety; and deleting redundant sections relat-
ing to collisions involving fixtures and 
"resume speed" road signs. - Laws 1975, ch. 
207. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles cS::o 160(5). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 382. 
7A AmJur 2d 421, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 245. 
Liability for automobile accident, other 
than direct collision with pedestrian, as 
affected by reliance upon or disregard of 
stop-and-go signal, 2 ALR 3d 12. 
Liability for collision of automobile with 
pedestrian at intersection as affected by reli-
ance upon or disregard of stop-and-go signal, 
2 ALR 3d 155. 
ARTICLE 10 













Pedestrians subject to traffic-control devices - Other controls. 
Pedestrians' right of way. 
Pedestrians yielding right of way. 
Emergency vehicle - Duties of driver and pedestrian. 
Passing closed railroad or bridge gate or barrier prohibited. 
Vehicles to exercise due care to avoid pedestrians and human-powered vehicles 
- Audible signals to be given. 
Drivers to yield right of way to blind persons - Exceptions - Use of cane -
Liability. 
Vehicle crossing sidewalk - Driver to yield. 
Pedestrians to use right half of crosswalks. 
Walking along or upon roadways - Standing in roadway for prohibited purposes 
- Yielding right of way to vehicles - Pedestrians under the influence. 
Unmarked crosswalk locations - Restrictions on pedestrian. 
41-6-77. Pedestrians subject to traffic-control devices - Other con-
trols. (1) A pedestrian shall obey the instructions of any official traffic-
control device specifically applicable to such pedestrian unless otherwise 
directed by a police officer. 
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(2) Pedestrians shall be subject to traffic and pedestrian-control signals 
as provided in sections 64-6-24 [41-6-24] and 41-6-25. 
(3) At all other places, pedestrians shall be accorded the privileges and 
be subject to the restrictions stated in this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-77, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 49. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1978, ch. 33, § 49 repealed old section 
41-6-77 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 64; C. 1943, 57-7-141; 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 71, § 1), declaring 
pedestrians subject to traffic-control signals 
at intersections and empowering local 
authorities to regulate the crossing of road-
ways by pedestrians, and enacted new section 
41-6-77. 
The bracketed reference to 41-6-24 was 
inserted by the compiler. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <P 5-7, 160(3). 
60 CJS Motor Vehicles § 35; 60A CJS Motor 
Vehicles§ 382. 
Rights and duties of pedestrians, 7A 
AmJur 2d 467 et seq., Automobiles and High-
way Traffic§ 285 et seq. 
41-6-78. Pedestrians' right of way. (1) (a) When traffic-control 
signals are not in place or not in operation the driver of a vehicle shall 
yield the right of way, slowing down or stopping if necessary to yield, to 
a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian 
is upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling, or 
when the pedestrian is approaching so closely from the opposite half of 
the roadway as to be in danger. 
(b) No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety 
and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close as to constitute 
an immediate hazard. Paragraph (1) (a) shall not apply under the condi-
tions stated in section 41-6-79 (2). 
(2) Whenever any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk or at any 
unmarked crosswalk at an intersection to permit a pedestrian to cross the 
roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear shall 
not overtake and pass such stopped vehicle. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 65; C. 1943, 
57-7-142; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 31; 1978, ch. 33, § 22. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment deleted "approaching 
so closely from the opposite half of the road-
way as to be in danger," after "the pedes-
trian is" in subsec. (a). 
The 1975 amendment substituted "so close 
as to constitute an immediate hazard" at the 
end of the first sentence in subsec. (a) for "so 
close that it is impossible for the driver to 
yield." 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs. 
(a) and (b) as (1) and (2); substituted "Para-
graph (l)(a)" at the beginning of the second 
sentence of subd. (l)(b) for "This provision"; 
and made minor changes in phraseology, 
punctuation and style. 
Crosswalks. 
Formerly a pedestrian was required to use 
crosswalks provided such crossing was within 
300 feet of another regular crossing of same 
highway. Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co. 
(1929) 75 U 87, 283 P 160. 
Duty of driver to yield right-of-way. 
Statutes or ordinances giving pedestrians 
the right-of-way at street crossings create a 
preferential but not an absolute right in the 
pedestrian's favor, and before the duty of a 
driver to yield the right-of-way arises, he 
must be in a situation whereby he is either 
aware of the presence of the pedestrian or 
should have, in the exercise of reasonable 
care, become aware of the presence of the 
pedestrian in time to yield the right-of-way. 
Charvoz v. Cottrell (1961) 12 U 2d 25, 361 P 
2d 516. 
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Instructions on "sudden emergency." 
It was not error for the trial court to 
refuse to give an instruction on sudden emer-
gency where the plaintiff's requested instruc-
tion did not cover the requisite element that 
the emergency must be one which arose 
without fault on the part of the plaintiff and 
defendant's evidence showed that plaintiff 
ran in front of defendant's vehicle when the 
latter was too close to avoid striking him. 
Gittens v. Lundberg (1955) 3 U 2d 392, 284 P 
2d 1115. 
Right-of-way. 
A pedestrian in a marked crosswalk has 
the right-of-way. The right-of-way rule 
simply means this: that if two persons are so 
proceeding that if they continued their 
course there would be danger of collision, the 
disfavored one must give way, and the 
favored one (the pedestrian) may proceed; 
and the favored one may assume that this 
will be done. It is of course recognized that 
the right-of-way rule would not apply if, 
when the favored one approached the cross-
ing point, the disfavored one was so close 
that in due care he could not or should not 
reasonably be expected to give way. Coombs 
v. Perry (1954) 2 U 2d 381, 275 P 2d 680. 
Rights and duties of pedestrians generally 
- Contributory negligence. 
Rights of pedestrians to use public streets 
are same as those of motorists and hence 
same general duties devolve upon them, and 
pedestrian crossing public street in crosswalk 
or pedestrian lane, although he may have 
right-of-way over vehicular traffic, has duty 
to observe such traffic, so that pedestrian 
who undertakes to cross busy street of large 
city, without first observing for vehicular 
traffic, is guilty of contributory negligence, 
even though he may be crossing in crosswalk 
and have right-of-way. Mingus v. Olsson 
(1949) 114 U 505, 201 P 2d 495, where 
deceased pedestrian who was struck by car 
while crossing street on crosswalk in Salt 
Lake City was held to be contributorily negli-
gent as matter of law in failing to keep 
proper lookout for approaching traffic. 
In determining whether it must be ruled as 
a matter of law that a pedestrian herself was 
negligent which contributed to cause her 
injury, consideration must be given, not only 
to the fact that she had the right-of-way 
upon which she could place some reliance, 
but also that a pedestrian crossing a busy 
street must be constantly vigilant for her 
safety with respect to all of the conditions 
around her. Even if a car is seen approach-
ing, unless it is so positioned as to constitute 
an immediate hazard to her, she is not neces-
sarily obliged to focus full and undivided 
attention on that particular car and so calcu-
late her entire conduct as to avoid being 
struck by it. This is not to say that a pedes-
trian may claim a right-of-way in face of 
danger. She must of course be watching for 
automobiles or other vehicles on the street, 
particularly from the direction whence traffic 
was most likely to come. Due care requires 
that she also keep a lookout ahead for other 
pedestrians, possible holes or obstructions in 
the street, and at least remain aware of the 
possibility of other traffic. Coombs v. Perry 
(1954) 2 U 2d 381, 275 P 2d 680. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <S:::> 160(4). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 388. 
Right of way as between pedestrian and 
vehicles, 7A AmJur 2d 421-423, Automobiles 
and Highway Traffic §§ 245-247. 
Darting or stepping suddenly into path of 
car, 65 ALR 192, 113 ALR 528. 
Duty to look before crossing street or high-
way, 79 ALR 1073. 
Duty to look for vehicles approaching on 
intersecting street, 9 ALR 1248, 44 ALR 1299. 
Failure to comply with statute regulating 
travel by pedestrian along highway as affect-
ing right to recovery for injuries or death 
resulting from collision with automobile, 45 
ALR 3d 658. 
41-6-79. Pedestrians yielding right of way. (1) Every pedestrian 
crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk 
or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right 
of way to all vehicles upon the roadway. 
(2) A.ny pedestrian crossing a roadway at a point where a pedestrian 
tunnel or overhead pedestrian crossing has been provided shall yield the 
right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway. 
(3) Between adjacent intersections at which traffic-control signals are 
in operation, pedestrians shall not cross at any place except in a marked 
crosswalk. 
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(4) No pedestrian shall cross a roadway intersection diagonally unless 
authorized by official traffic-control devices; and, when authorized to cross 
diagonally, pedestrians shall cross only in accordance with the official traf-
fic-control devices pertaining to such crossing movements. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-79, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 207, § 32; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 23. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1975, ch. 207, § 32 repealed old 
section 41-6-79 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 66; C. 1943, 
57-7-143; L. 1969, ch. 110, § 1), relating to 
pedestrians yielding the right of way, cross-
ing roadways only at marked crosswalks and 
prohibiting pedestrians from crossing inter-
sections diagonally, and enacted new section 
41-6-79. 
The 1978 amendment inserted "accordance 
with the official traffic-control devices per-
taining to" in subsec. (4); and made minor 
changes in style. 
Construction and application. 
Pedestrian was contributorily negligent as 
matter of law, where he proceeded to cross 
street at night at place other than marked 
crosswalk, knowing that there were traffic 
control lights and marked crosswalks at 
adjacent intersections, and failed to con-
stantly observe movement of approaching 
traffic after reaching a position approxi-
mately eight feet past center of street. Sant 
v. Miller (1949) 115 U 559, 206 P 2d 719. 
Pedestrian who was walking across poorly 
lit highway was contributorily negligent as a 
matter of Jaw where, in response to a call 
from his wife, he turned and walked directly 
into path of defendant's automobile. Crossing 
a highway at a point where there was no 
marked crosswalk, the pedestrian was duty 
bound to yield the right-of-way to a vehicle 
upon the roadway. Cox v. Thompson (1953) 
123 U 81, 254 P 2d 1047. 
Exclusion of rebuttal testimony as to 
motorist's speed and refusal to reopen case to 
permit introduction of such testimony was 
not prejudicial error in suit to recover for 
death of pedestrian who was struck while 
crossing street in area other than marked 
crosswalk since there was evidence as to 
decedent's negligence. Duncan v. Western 
Refrigeration Co. (1960) 11 U 2d 19, 354 P 2d 
572. 
Contributory negligence. 
A pedestrian was guilty of contributory 
negligence where after walking across two 
lanes of a four-lane highway within a 
marked crosswalk she left the crosswalk and 
walked down the center of the street. By 
attempting to cross the street in disregard of 
safety rules, she was charged with a high 
standard of care, the duty being commensu-
rate with the perilous circumstances. Smith 
v. Bennett (1953) 1 U 2d 224, 265 P 2d 401. 
Instruction. 
An instruction given literally in accord 
with former subsec. (a) of this section was 
not erroneous for failure to add "so near as 
to constitute an immediate hazard" since 
there were no circumstances requiring such 
addition. Holmes v. Heidebrecht (1960) 10 U 
2d 74, 348 P 2d 565. 
An instruction in the words of former 
subsec. (a) of this section simply means that 
where two persons are proceeding in such 
manner that if they continued there would be 
a collision, the disfavored one must give way 
and the favored one may proceed. It does not 
mean that the favored one may claim the 
right-of-way over the disfavored one regard-
less of the hazards involved. Fox v. Taylor 
(1960) 10 U 2d 174, 350 P 2d 154. 
Operation and effect. 
The right-of-way statutes are designed to 
prevent an accident by two persons, both 
otherwise lawfully on the roadway, reaching 
the same place at the same time. The right-
of-way is not absolute for either pedestrian 
or motorist, but both have a continuing duty 
at all times to use reasonable care for the 
safety of others, even when one has the 
right-of-way over the other. Langlois v. Rees 
(1960) 10 U 2d 272, 351 P 2d 638. 
Pedestrian walking along driveway. 
Motorist's general duty to stop before 
crossing sidewalk was not applicable to 
situation in which pedestrian was walking 
along driveway and was not on a sidewalk 
when struck by car backing from garage; 
both parties had duty to use due care for 
safety of themselves and each other. Ivie v. 
Richardson (1959) 9 U 2d 5,336 P 2d 781. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <S:,, 160(1). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 389. 
7A AmJur 2d 467, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 286. 
Crossing street at unusual place or diago-
nally, 14 ALR 1176, 67 ALR 313. 
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41-6-79.10. Emergency vehicle - Duties of driver and pedestrian. 
(1) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle 
making use of an audible signal meeting the requirements of section 
41-6-146, and visual signals meeting the requirements of section 41-6-14 or 
section 41-6-140, or of a police vehicle properly and lawfully making use 
of an audible signal, every pedestrian shall yield the right of way to the 
authorized emergency vehicle. 
(2) This section shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency 
vehicle from the duty to drive with regard for the safety of all persons 
using the highway, nor from the duty to exercise due care to avoid colliding 
with any pedestrian. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-79.10, enacted by L. Compiler's Notes. 
1975, ch. 207, § 33; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 24. The 1978 amendment substituted "section 
41-6-14 or section 41-6-140" for "section 
41-6-140" in subsec. (1); and made minor 
changes in phraseology and style. 
41-6-79.20. Passing closed railroad or bridge gate or barrier pro-
hibited. No pedestrian shall pass through, around, over or under any cross-
ing gate or barrier at a railroad crossing or bridge while such gate or 
barrier is closed or is being opened or closed. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-79.20, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 207, § 34. 
41-6-80. Vehicles to exercise due care to avoid pedestrians and 
human-powered vehicles - Audible signals to be given. Notwithstand-
ing other provisions of this chapter or any local ordinance, every driver 
of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian 
or any person propelling a human powered vehicle and shall give an audi-
ble signal when necessary and exercise proper precaution upon observing 
any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated or intoxicated person. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-80, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 39. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1969, ch. 111, § 7 repealed old section 
41-6-80 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 67; C. 1943, 57-7-144; 
L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1), relating to driver's duty 
to exercise due care on observing a child, 
incapacitated person or person with a white 
cane or guide dog, and new section 41-6-80 
was enacted by Laws 1978, ch. 33, § 39. 
41-6-80.l. Drivers to yield right of way to blind persons - Excep-
tions - Use of cane - Liability. (1) The driver of a vehicle approaching 
a blind or partially blind pedestrian crossing a roadway or thoroughfare, 
carrying a cane predominately white or metallic in color (with or without 
a red tip) or using a guide dog, shall bring his vehicle to a complete stop 
and yield the right of way to the blind person. Any person who fails to 
stop and yield the right of way is liable for any loss or damage which 
results as a proximate cause of failure to yield the right of way to blind 
persons; except that blind or partially blind persons shall exercise due care 
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in approaching and crossing said roadways and thoroughfares and shall 
yield right of way to emergency vehicles sounding a bell, a siren or other 
noise device. 
(2) A person blind or partially blind, and no other person, may carry 
a cane as described in subsection (1). 
History: L. 1969, ch. 111, § 3; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 25. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment deleted "motor" 
before "vehicle" near the beginning of 
subsec. (1); and made a minor change in 
phraseology. 
Repealing Clause. 
Section 7 of Laws 1969, ch. 111 provided: 
"Section 41-6-80, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah, 
1961, is repealed." 
Cross-References. 
Rights and privileges of blind and disabled 
persons, 26-30-1 et seq. 
41-6-80.5. Vehicle crossing sidewalk - Driver to yield. The driver 
of a vehicle crossing a sidewalk shall yield the right of way to any pedes-
trian and all other traffic on the sidewalk. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-80.5, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 40. 
41-6-81. Pedestrians to use right half of crosswalks. Pedestrians 
shall move, whenever practicable, upon the right half of crosswalks. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 68; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
57-7-145. Automobiles ~ 160(4). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 389. 
41-6-82. Walking along or upon roadways - Standing in roadway 
for prohibited purposes - Yielding right of way to vehicles - Pedes-
trians under the influence. (1) Where sidewalks are provided and their 
use is practicable, it is unlawful for any pedestrians to walk along and 
upon an adjacent roadway. 
(2) Where sidewalks are not provided any pedestrians walking along 
and upon a highway shall when practicable walk only on a shoulder as 
far as practicable from the edge of the roadway. 
(3) Where neither a sidewalk or a shoulder is available, any pedestrian 
walking along or upon a highway shall walk as near as practicable to an 
outside edge of the roadway, and if on a two-way roadway, shall walk only 
on the left side of the roadway. 
(4) No person shall stand in a roadway or shoulder area for the purpose 
of soliciting from the occupant of any vehicle a ride, employment, the park-
ing, watching or guarding of a vehicle or other business. 
(5) No pedestrian who is under the influence of alcohol or any drug to 
a degree which renders such person a hazard shall walk or be upon a high-
way except on a sidewalk or sidewalk area. 
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, pedestrians upon a 
roadway, shall yield the right of way to all vehicles upon the roadway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 69; C. 1943, 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 35; 1978, ch. 
57-7-146; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 33, § 26. 
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Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted subsec. (a); 
designated the provisions prohibiting solic-
itation of rides as subsec. (c); and added 
subsec. (b). 
The 1955 amendment added the prohibi-
tions against soliciting employment, parking, 
watching or guarding a vehicle or other busi-
ness to subsec. (c). 
The 1961 amendment substituted "pedes-
trians" for "pedestrian" in subsecs. (a) and 
(b); and made a minor change in phraseology. 
The 1975 amendment inserted "and their 
use is practicable" in subsec. (a); substituted 
"walk only on a shoulder as far as practi-
cable from the edge of the roadway" in 
subsec. (b) for "walk only on the left side of 
the roadway or its shoulder facing traffic 
which may approach from the opposite direc-
tion"; inserted subsec. (c); redesignated 
former subsec. (c) as subsec. (d); inserted "or 
shoulder area" in subsec. (d); and added 
subsec. (e). 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs. 
(a) to (d) as (1) to (4); inserted subsec. (5); 
redesignated subsec. (e) as (6); and made 
minor changes in phraseology. 
Collateral References. 
Admissibility of evidence of habit, custom-
ary behavior, or reputation as to care of 
pedestrian on question of his care at time of 
collision with motor vehicle giving rise to his 
injury or death, 28 ALR 3d 1293. 
Anti-hitchhiking laws, their construction 
and effect in action for injury to hitchhiker, 
18 ALR 1447, 68 ALR 2d 300. 
Failure to comply with statute regulating 
travel by pedestrian along highway as affect-
ing right to recovery for injuries or death 
resulting from collision with automobile, 45 
ALR 3d 658. 
Walking on left-hand side of road, 67 ALR 
96, 93 ALR 551. 
41-6-82.10. Unmarked crosswalk locations - Restrictions on pedes-
trian. The department of transportation and local authorities in their 
respective jurisdictions may after an engineering and traffic investigation 
designate unmarked crosswalk locations where pedestrian crossing is pro-
hibited or where pedestrians must yield the right of way to vehicles. [Such] 
restrictions shall be effective only when official traffic-control devices indi-
cating the restrictions are in place. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-82.10, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 207, § 36; L. 1979, ch. 242, § 19. 
mission"; and substituted "restrictions" for 
"restriction." 
Compiler's Notes. 
The bracketed word "such" was inserted by 
the compiler. 
The 1979 amendment substituted "depart-

















BICYCLES, REGULATION OF OPERATION 
Parents and guardians shall not authorize violations of act - Regulations applica-
ble to bicycles. 
Bicycle riders subject to chapter. 
Regular seat required - Carrying more persons than design permits prohibited 
- Exceptions. 
Persons on bicycles, skates and sleds not to attach to vehicles - Exceptions. 
Riding of bicycle on and use of roadway - Bicyclist's duties. 
Bicycles to yield right of way to pedestrians - Laws applicable to pedestrians. 
Bicycles - Parking on sidewalk - Prohibitions - Parking on roadway. 
Bicycles - Turns - Designated bicycle lanes. 
Bicycles - Turn signals. 
Bicycle inspections - At request of officer. 
Bicycle racing - Prohibitions - Exceptions - Exemptions from traffic laws. 
One hand on handle bars. 
Prohibited equipment - Brakes required. 
Bicycles - Lamps required - Reflective material required. 
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41-6-83. Parents and guardians shall not authorize violations of act 
- Regulations applicable to bicycles. (a) The parent of any child and 
the guardian of any ward shall not authorize or knowingly permit any such 
child or ward to violate any of the provisions of this act. 
(b) These regulations applicable to bicycles shall apply whenever a 
bicycle is operated upon any highway or upon any path set aside for the 
exclusive use of bicycles subject to those exceptions stated herein. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 70; C. 1943, 
57-7-147. 
Cross-References. 
Dealer licensing of bicycles, 11-21-1. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles cs,,, 162(7). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles § 396. 
Bicyclists, 7 A AmJur 2d 851 et seq., Auto-
mobiles and Highway Traffic § 618 et seq. 
41-6-84. Bicycle riders subject to chapter. Every person riding a 
bicycle is subject to the provisions of this chapter applicable to the driver 
of a vehicle except as to those provisions of this chapter which by their 
nature can have no application. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 71; C. 1943, 
57-7-148; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 27. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment deleted "upon a road-
way" after "bicycle" near the beginning: of 
the section; substituted "chapter" for ••~t"' 
in two places; and deleted "special regula-
tions in this act and except as to those" 
before "provisions of this chapter"; and made 
minor changes in phraseology. 
Cross-References. 
Driving on right side of highway, excep-
tions, 41-6-53. 
Child bicycle rider. 
The child bicycle rider must exercise that 
degree of care which ordinarily would be 
observed by children of the same age, intelli-
gence, and experience under similar circum-
stances, and whether a child acted negli-
gently is a question for the jury to decide 
according to this standard. Donohue v. 
Rolando (1965) 16 U 2d 294, 400 P 2d 12. 
41-6-85. Regular seat required - Carrying more persons than 
design permits prohibited - Exceptions. (1) A person propelling a 
bicycle shall not ride other than upon or astride a permanent and regular 
seat attached thereto. 
(2) No bicycle shall be used to carry more persons at one time than 
the number for which it is designed or equipped, except that an adult rider 
may carry a child securely attached to his person in a back pack or sling. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 72; C. 1943, 
57-7-149; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 37; 1978, ch. 33, 
§ 28. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1975 amendment inserted "or astride" 
in subsec. (a); deleted "nor carry any other 
person upon such bicycle other than upon a 
firmly attached and regular seat _thereon nor 
shall any person ride upon a bicycle other 
than as above authorized" at the end of 
subsec. (a); and made a minor change in 
phraseology. 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs. 
(a) and (b) as (1) and (2); added the exception 
to subsec. (2); and made minor changes in 
phraseology. 
41-6-86. Persons on bicycles, skates and sleds not to attach to vehi-
cles - Exceptions. (1) No person riding a bicycle, coaster, roller skates, 
sled, or toy vehicle shall attach the same or himself to any vehicle upon 
a roadway. 
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(2) This section shall not prohibit attaching a bicycle trailer or bicycle 
semitrailer to a bicycle if that trailer or semitrailer has been designed for 
such attachment. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 73; C. 1943, 
57-7-150; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 29. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1978 amendment designated the 
former section as subsec. (1); added subsec. 
(2); and made a minor change in phraseology. 
41-6-87. Riding of bicycle on and use of roadway - Bicyclist's 
duties. (1) Every person operating a bicycle upon a roadway shall ride 
as near to the right side of the roadway as practicable, exercising due care 
when passing a standing vehicle or one proceeding in the same direction. 
(2) Persons riding bicycles upon a roadway shall not ride more than 
two abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the exclu-
sive use of bicycles. Persons riding two abreast shall not impede the 
normal and reasonable movement of traffic and, on a laned roadway, shall 
ride within a single lane. 
(3) Wherever a usable 'path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to 
a roadway, bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 74; C. 1943, 
57-7-151; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, § 30. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted subsec. (a); 
designated the provisions for riding two 
abreast as subsec. (b); and added subsec. (c). 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs. 
(a) to (c) as (1) to (3); added the second sen-
. tence of subsec. (2); and made minor changes 
in phraseology and punctuation. 
Contributory negligence. 
The rule in this jurisdiction that a Jaw 
violation is negligence as a matter of law 
does not overcome the rule that the contribu-
tory negligence of a child is to be determined 
according to the proper standard of care with 
which he is charged. It does not mean that 
the statutory violation rule is nullified where 
children are involved. If the violation of a 
statute by a child is found to evidence less 
care than that which ordinarily could be 
expected of a child of the same age, intelli-
gence, knowledge, and experience, he could be 
held contributorily negligent barring his 
recovery by a jury as a question of fact about 
which there might be reasonable difference 
of opinion. Morby v. Rogers (1953) 122 U 540, 
252 P 2d 231. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles <9 162(7). 
60A CJS Motor Vehicles§ 396. 
7A AmJur 2d 854, Automobiles and High-
way Traffic § 620. 
Reciprocal duties of driver of automobile 
and bicyclist, 172 ALR 736. 
41-6-87.3. Bicycles to yield right of way to pedestrians - Laws 
applicable to pedestrians. (1) A person propelling a bicycle upon and 
along a sidewalk, or across a roadway upon and along a crosswalk, shall 
yield the right of way to any pedestrian and shall give audible signal 
before overtaking and passing such pedestrian. 
(2) A person shall not ride a bicycle upon and along a sidewalk, or 
across a roadway upon and along a crosswalk, where use of bicycles is pro-
hibited by official traffic-control devices. 
(3) A person propelling a vehicle by human power upon and along a 
sidewalk, or across a roadway upon and along a crosswalk, shall have all 
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the rights and duties applicable to a pedestrian under the same circum-
stances. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.3, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 41. 
41-6-87.4. Bicycles - Parking on sidewalk - Prohibitions - Park-
ing on roadway. (1) A person may park a bicycle on a sidewalk unless 
prohibited or restricted by an official traffic-control device. 
(2) A bicycle parked on a sidewalk shall not impede the normal and 
reasonable movement of pedestrian or other traffic. 
(3) A bicycle may be parked on the roadway at any angle to the curb 
or edge of the roadway at any location where parking is allowed. 
(4) A bicycle may be parked on the roadway abreast of another bicycle 
or bicycles near the side of the roadway at any location where parking is 
allowed. 
(5) A person shall not park a bicycle on a roadway in such a manner 
as to obstruct the movement of a legally parked motor vehicle. 
(6) In all other respects, bicycles parked anywhere on a highway shall 
conform with the provisions of article 14 regulating the parking of vehicles. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.4, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 42. 
41-6-87.5. Bicycles - Turns - Designated bicycle lanes. (1) A 
person riding a bicycle intending to turn left shall comply with section 
41-6-66 or subsection (2). 
(2) A person riding a bicycle intending to turn left shall approach the 
turn as close as practicable to the right curb or edge of the roadway. After 
proceeding across the intersecting roadway, the turn shall be made as close 
as practicable to the curb or edge of the roadway on the far side of the 
intersection. After turning, the bicyclist shall comply with any official traf-
fic-control device or police officer regulating traffic along the highway 
intended to be traveled. 
(3) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, the department of trans-
portation and local authorities in their respective jurisdictions may cause 
official traffic-control devices to be placed and thereby require and direct 
that a specific course be traveled by turning bicycles, and when such 
devices are so placed, no person shall turn a bicycle other than as directed 
and required by such devices. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.5, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 43. 
41-6-87.7. Bicycles - Turn signals. (1) Except as provided in this 
section, a person riding a bicycle shall comply with section 41-6-69. 
(2) A signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be 
given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the 
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bicycle before turning, and shall be given while the bicycle is stopped wait-
ing to turn. A signal by hand and arm need not be given continuously if 
the hand is needed in the control or operation of the bicycle. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.7, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 44. 
41-6-87.8. Bicycle inspections - At request of officer. A uniformed 
police officer may at any time upon reasonable cause to believe that a bicy-
cle is unsafe or not equipped as required by law, or that its equipment 
is not in proper adjustment or repair, require the person riding the bicycle 
to stop and submit the bicycle to an inspection and such test with reference 
thereto as may be appropriate. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.8, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 45. 
41-6-87.9. Bicycle racing - Prohibitions - Exceptions - Exemp-
tions from traffic laws. (1) Bicycle racing on highways is prohibited by 
section 41-6-51, except as authorized in this section. 
(2) Bicycle racing on a highway is not unlawful when a racing event 
is approved by state or local authorities on any highway under their 
respective jurisdictions. Approval of bicycle highway racing events shall 
be granted only under conditions which assure reasonable safety for all 
race participants, spectators and other highway users, and which prevent 
unreasonable interference with traffic flow which would seriously incon-
venience other highway users. 
(3) By agreement with the approving authority, participants in an 
approved bicycle highway racing event may be exempted from compliance 
with any traffic laws otherwise applicable, provided that traffic control is 
adequate to assure the safety of all highway users. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-87.9, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 46. 
41-6-88. One hand on handle bars. No person operating a bicycle shall 
carry any package, bundle, or article which prevents the driver from keep-
ing at least one hand upon the handle bars. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 75; C. 1943, Compiler's Notes. 
57-7-152; L. 1975, ch. 207, § 38. The 1975 amendment substituted "oper-
ating" for "riding"; and substituted "driver" 
for "rider." 
41-6-89. Prohibited equipment - Brakes required. (1) A bicycle 
shall not be equipped with, nor shall any person use upon a bicycle, any 
siren or whistle. 
(2) Every bicycle shall be equipped with a brake or brakes which will 
enable its driver to stop the bicycle within 25 feet from a speed of 10 miles 
per hour on dry, level, clean pavement. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 76; C. 1943, Compiler's Notes. 
57-7-153; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, § 31. The 1949 amendment added subsec. (b). 
389 
41-6-90 MOTOR VEHICLES 
The 1978 amendment redesignated subsecs. 
(a) and (b) as (1) and (2); deleted a require-
ment that bicycle be equipped with bell or 
other device audible for 100 feet; and made 
minor changes in phraseology. 
41-6-90. Bicycles - Lamps required - Reflective material 
required. (1) Every bicycle in use at the times described in section 
41-6-118 shall be equipped with a lamp on the front emitting a white light 
visible from a distance of at least 500 feet to the front and with a red 
reflector of a type approved by the department which shall be visible for 
500 feet to the rear when directly in front of lawful lower beams of head 
lamps on a motor vehicle. 
(2) Every bicycle when in use at the times described in section 41-6-118 
shall be equipped with reflective material of sufficient size and reflectivity 
to be visible from both sides for 500 feet when directly in front of lawful 
lower beams of head lamps on a motor vehicle, or, in lieu of such reflective 
material, with a lighted lamp visible from both sides from a distance of 
at least 500 feet. 
(3) A bicycle or its rider may be equipped with lights or reflectors in 
addition to those required by subsections (1) and (2). 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-90, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 50. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Laws 1978, ch. 33, § 50 repealed old section 
41-6-90 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 77; C. 1943, 57-7-154; 
L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, § 39), relat-
ing to lights and reflectors on bicycles oper-
ated at night, and enacted new section 
41-6-90. 
Violation as negligence. 
Riding of bicycle in dark without lamp was 
violation of ordinance and this statute and 
thus established some negligence as a matter 
of law; whether absence of lamp was contrib-
uting proximate cause of collision between 
bicycle and taxicab was jury question. Gibbs 
v. Blue Cab (1952) 122 U 312, 249 P 2d 213. 
ARTICLE 12 
RAILROAD TRAINS AND SAFETY ZONES 
Section 
41-6-91, 41-6-92. Repealed. 
41-6-93. Driving on tracks. 
· 41-6-94. Driving through safety zone. 
41-6-91, 41-6-92. Repealed. 
Repeal. to passing railroad trains, were repealed by 
Sections 41-6-91, 41-6-92 (L. 1941, ch. 52, Laws 1979, ch. 242, § 74. 
§§ 78, 79; C. 1943, 57-7-155, 57-7-156), relating 
41-6-93. Driving on tracks. (a) It is unlawful for the driver of any 
vehicle proceeding upon any track in front of a railroad train upon a street 
to fail to remove such vehicle from the track as soon as practicable after 
signal from the operator of such train. 
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(b) When a railroad train has started to cross an intersection no driver 
of a vehicle shall drive upon or cross the tracks or in the path of such 
train within the intersection in front of such train. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 80; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
57-7-157. Liability for accident at point where high-
way leads to, but does not cross, railroad 
tracks, 47 ALR 863. 
41-6-94. Driving through safety zone. No vehicle shall at any time be 
driven through or within a safety zone. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 81; C. 1943, 
57-7-158. 
waiting for streetcar, 47 ALR 1233, 123 ALR 
791. 
Collateral References. 
Validity of safety zone ordinance, 79 ALR 
1328. 
Liability of owner of motor vehicle for 











SPECIAL STOPS REQUIRED 
Railroad grade crossing - Duty to stop - Driving through, around or under 
gate or barrier prohibited. 
Trains - Interference with vehicles limited. 
Repealed. 
Railroad grade crossings - Certain vehicles must stop - Exceptions - Regula-
tions. 
Duties respecting crawler type tractor, power shovel, derrick or other equipment 
or structure. 
Designation of through highways - Stop signs, yield signs and traffic-control 
devices - Designation of intersections as locations for preferential right-of-
way treatment. 
Vehicles emerging from alleys, buildings, private roads or driveways must stop 
prior to sidewalk area or street. 
School bus - Signs and light signals - Flashing amber lights - Flashing red 
lights - Passing school bus with caution - Duty to stop - Operation of 
signals. 
41-6-95. Railroad grade crossing - Duty to stop - Driving 
through, around or under gate or barrier prohibited. (a) Whenever any 
person driving a vehicle approaches a railroad grade crossing, the driver 
of such vehicle shall stop within fifty feet but not less than ten feet from 
the nearest track of such railroad and shall not proceed until he can do 
so safely when: 
(1) A clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device gives warning 
of the immediate approach of a train. 
(2) A crossing gate is lowered, or when a human flagman gives or con-
tinues to give a signal of the approach or passage of a train. 
(3) A railroad train approaching within approximately 1,500 feet of the 
highway crossing emits a signal audible from such distance and such train 
by reason of its speed or nearness to such crossing is an immediate hazard. 
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